Monday, July 11, 2005
Purchases of Uranium in Niger
Once again the question arises of the alleged reliance of the Bush and Blair administrations on forged documents to support their concern for potential purchases by Iraq of uranium from Niger. The 14 July 2004 "Review of Intelligence of Weapons of Mass Destruction" authored by the British committee led by Lord Butler provides important insights into the issue.
Lord Butler's committee found that British intelligence learned that an Iraqi diplomat visited Niger in 1999. Since Iraq had purchased uranium from Niger in the 1970s and uranium ore constitutes almost 75% of Niger's exports, British intelligence concluded that the Iraqi diplomat sought to purchase uranium. British intelligence subsequently learned that the Iraqis also attempted to purchase uranium from the Democratic Republic of Congo with whom a formal purchase agreement was reached in 2002.
During 2002 British intelligence received additional information that confirmed that the 1999 Iraqi diplomat's visit to Niger related to the purchase of uranium, "though there was disagreement as to whether a sale had been agreed and uranium shipped." (Butler par. 495)
The Butler Committee concluded that these reports provided the basis of President Bush's statement in the State of the Union address of 28 January 2003 that "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." Note that the President referred to "Africa," not simply Niger; this would include the report regarding the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as Niger, though discussion focuses solely on Niger.
According to the Butler Committee, the British government learned of the forged document only in early 2003. Thus, it concluded that the "forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it." (Butler, par. 503d.) The assessment was made in September 2002. (Butler par. 496)
The forgeries are simply irrelevant to any discussion of intelligence assessments of alleged attempts to purchase uranium in Africa by Iraq. They were not considered by British intelligence in making its assessment that led to PM Blair's and President Bush's statements regarding such attempts to purchase uranium.
The much discussed report of retired ambassador Joseph Wilson apparently reinforced the CIA's belief that Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger rather than debunking it as he subsequently claimed. The Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found that Mr. Wilson reported discussions with the former Prime Minister of Niger as confirming that the Iraqi delegation wanted to expand commercial relations with Niger. The former Prime Minister "interpreted "expanding commercial relations' to mean that the delegation wanted to discuss uranium yellowcake sales."
The Select Committee concluded that "The report on the former ambassador's trip to Niger, disseminated in March 2002, did not change any analysts' assessments of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. For most analysts, the information in the report lent more credibility to the original Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports on the uranium deal ...."
Since Mr. Wilson's report to the CIA occurred before the forged documents were received, neither his report nor the conclusions of the CIA based on his report could have been impacted by the forged documents.
# posted by Thomas A. Becket : 1:34 PM
