Saturday, July 16, 2005
Rove and Niger
Many on the left want to convict Rove and look at the evidence later. We simply do not have knowledge of all of the evidence or even potential legal issues that the Special Prosecutor is finding and evaluating. Given that, everyone should be circumspect in their conclusions, take a deep breath and refrain from hyperventilating.
However, based on available information, the biggest attack on Joe Wilson's credibility comes, not from Karl Rove and his supporters, but the Report of the bipartisan Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It points to a number of instances in which his description of his findings to Committee staff differed from that of the CIA's accounts of those findings. (Report, p. 44)
The bottom line in the controversy between the CIA interpretation of Mr. Wilson’s report to them and Mr. Wilson’s personal conclusions and that of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) seems to be the following.
CIA concludes that a visit from an Iraqi ambassador to Niger indicated an attempt to purchase uranium. Mr. Wilson reported discussions with the former Prime Minister of Niger as confirming that the Iraqi delegation wanted to expand commercial relations with Niger. The former Prime Minister "interpreted ‘expanding commercial relations' to mean that the delegation wanted to discuss uranium yellowcake sales." For the CIA this confirmed their conclusion that Iraq was seeking to purchase uranium in Niger. (Report, p. 43)
The Select Committee concluded that "The report on the former ambassador's trip to Niger, disseminated in March 2002, did not change any analysts' assessments of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. For most analysts, the information in the report lent more credibility to the original Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports on the uranium deal ...." (Report p. 73)
On the other hand, INR analysts believed that Mr. Wilson’s report “supported their assessment that Niger was unlikely to be willing or able to sell uranium to Iraq.” (Report p. 73) This arose from a belief in the State Department that France adequately controlled the sale of all uranium from Niger and would not allow sales to rogue states such as Iraq. State also believed that Niger would not trade with a country under UN sanctions. (Report, p. 44)
"Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick told Committee staff she recalled the former ambassador (Mr. Wilson) saying 'he had reached the same conclusions that the embassy had reached, that it was highly unlikely that anything was going on." (Report, p. 42) Thus, INR and Mr. Wilson had such faith in France and Niger that they would prevent any sales of uranium to Iraq.
Of course, this does not speak to the issue of whether Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger, the concern of CIA. Mr. Wilson’s report of his conversations with the Prime Minister confirmed the CIA that Iraq had, in fact, attempted to purchase uranium from Niger regardless of whether an actual sale occurred or whether Niger could deliver uranium if a contract were entered into.
It seems to me that in assessing the risks of Iraq, the more critical issue is whether Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger rather than whether it could have, in reality, done so. Thus, the CIA conclusion more specifically speaks to the real issue rather than the INA assessment and the personal conclusion of Mr. Wilson.
Why is this the case? If Iraq were seeking uranium from Niger, it indicates an active nuclear program and a desire to have nuclear weapons. Niger was not the only potential source for either. Even if the French were successful in closing the door in Niger, Iraq could have purchased uranium elsewhere and conceivably could have been seeking to buy a nuclear weapon from someone.
One may quarrel with the conclusions of the CIA and INR. One may suggest that the Administration overreacted to the CIA reports. One may also suggest that State’s reliance on the good offices of France and Niger to prevent the sale of a profitable product was misplaced. However, as fully recognized by the bipartisan Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the British report of Lord Butler Committee, both the CIA and British intelligence found that Iraq was seeking to purchase uranium in Africa. That may or may not be correct, but no one lied regarding the intelligence findings.
# posted by Thomas A. Becket : 8:54 AM
