Tuesday, June 21, 2005
A review of the "Downing Street Memos" clearly show that Britain and the USA honestly believed that Saddam Hussein had WMD programmes. The memos provide helpful insights into the thinking of the two governments at the time:
Options Paper
“Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened.”
“The US has lost confidence in containment. … Washington believes the legal basis for an attack on Iraq already exists.”
“With his regime in danger, Saddam could use WMD, either before or during an invasion. Saddam could also target Israel as he did during the Gulf War.”
Ricketts Memo
“The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein’s WMD programmes, but our tolerance of them post-11 September.
Downing Street Memo
“For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.”
Straw Memo
“If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US would now be considering military action against Iraq. … What has however changed is the tolerance of the international community (especially the US), the world having witnesses on September 11 just what evil determined people these days perpetuate.”
Those who believe the “Downing Street Memos” indicate that the US and Britain manufactured the existence of WMD out of nothing simply have not read the documents. Clearly, the British believed that Saddam possessed WMD and could use them at will. The Bush administration did not manufacture such evidence to justify its decisions to attack Saddam.
The Foreign Secretary believed that the US would not be considering military action against Iraq but for 11 September. Mr. Drum focuses on the Options Memo statement that “In the judgment of the JIC there is no recent evidence of Iraq complicity with international terrorism. There is therefore no justification for action against Iraq based on self-defence (Article 51) to combat imminent threats of terrorism as in Afghanistan.”
However, a fair reading of the section suggests that the words “recent” and “complicity” indicate the likelihood that British intelligence may have found links between Saddam and Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations in the past. Apparently, however, in the view of the British government those relationships were not recent enough or linked to actual violence (“terrorism”) to support a military response.
The Report of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found many connections between Iraq and various terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda. While such contacts may not rise to the level of complicity in the perpetration of terrorist bombings to justify the invasion of Iraq from a legal standpoint, they may have given great concern to both the British and the American governments in a post-11 September world.
Options Paper
“Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened.”
“The US has lost confidence in containment. … Washington believes the legal basis for an attack on Iraq already exists.”
“With his regime in danger, Saddam could use WMD, either before or during an invasion. Saddam could also target Israel as he did during the Gulf War.”
Ricketts Memo
“The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein’s WMD programmes, but our tolerance of them post-11 September.
Downing Street Memo
“For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.”
Straw Memo
“If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US would now be considering military action against Iraq. … What has however changed is the tolerance of the international community (especially the US), the world having witnesses on September 11 just what evil determined people these days perpetuate.”
Those who believe the “Downing Street Memos” indicate that the US and Britain manufactured the existence of WMD out of nothing simply have not read the documents. Clearly, the British believed that Saddam possessed WMD and could use them at will. The Bush administration did not manufacture such evidence to justify its decisions to attack Saddam.
The Foreign Secretary believed that the US would not be considering military action against Iraq but for 11 September. Mr. Drum focuses on the Options Memo statement that “In the judgment of the JIC there is no recent evidence of Iraq complicity with international terrorism. There is therefore no justification for action against Iraq based on self-defence (Article 51) to combat imminent threats of terrorism as in Afghanistan.”
However, a fair reading of the section suggests that the words “recent” and “complicity” indicate the likelihood that British intelligence may have found links between Saddam and Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations in the past. Apparently, however, in the view of the British government those relationships were not recent enough or linked to actual violence (“terrorism”) to support a military response.
The Report of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found many connections between Iraq and various terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda. While such contacts may not rise to the level of complicity in the perpetration of terrorist bombings to justify the invasion of Iraq from a legal standpoint, they may have given great concern to both the British and the American governments in a post-11 September world.
# posted by Thomas A. Becket : 11:59 AM
